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Bureau of the BudgetThis paper summarizes the results of a bit of limited research
into one of the major factors that makes for differences in per
capita income between countries —thestage and pattern of
industrialization. By stage of industrialization is meant the pro-
portion of a country's working population engaged in the primary
occupations—agriculture, forestry, and fishing; by pattern of
industrialization, the relative importance of secondary occupa-
tions—manufacturing, mining, and construction, and of tertiary
occupations—trade and services.
The material presented here is restricted to simple proportions
of the labor force engaged in agriculture and no attempt is made
to treat other factors making for differences in per capita income
(such as capital, education, productivity of resources, distribution
of income, proximity to markets, living and consumption habits).
Two qualifying statements may therefore be called for at the
start. From this selection of one factor, occupational distribution,
it should not be inferred that we think other factors are not im-
portant or, in some cases, much more important; and when we
point to the need for different occupational proportions in vari-
ous areas without discussing the methods and social and eco-
nomic problems that would be involved in such changes it should
not be inferred that we underestimate the economic and social
problems that would be involved in such changes merely because
we do not discuss them in this paper.
A reduction in the agricultural proportion can of course take
place as a result of (1)areduction in the number engaged in
farming; (2)anincrease in the number engaged in other indus-
tries; (3) a relatively greater decline in the number engaged in
farming than the decline in other industries or a relatively smaller
increase than the increase in other industries. Any of these shifts
would normally be accompanied by such technological aids and
developments as would raise agricultural productivity, and lead
to greater urban per capita income, which in turn would lead to
greater agricultural income, which finally would augment rural
demand for industrial products—all of which would tend to
raise the general average per capita income.
The course of industrialization has been speeded up almost
everywhere by the war and will certainly engage attention more
and more after the war. If we get the kind of peace and inter-
national economic cooperation we are fighting for, the future
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courseof industrialization in various countries is quite likely to
be molded more consciously than in the past. To that end much
more basic data on national incomes by countries are needed,
but even the data at hand, despite their known shortcomings, may
be made to reveal certain broad features in the relation of indus-
trialization to per capita incomes that should be useful guides
to economic programs.
In this paper the different effects on per capita incomes that
may be expected from expansion in primary, secondary, and
tertiary industries are examined. With few exceptions, living
standards may be expected to rise and world trade increase as the
inhabitants of more and more agricultural countries go into
secondary and tertiary occupations; also, with few exceptions,
such as in our southern states, the greater the emphasis on trade
and services, as compared with manufacturing, the greater the
rise in per capita incomes. Adequate historical data by occupa-
tional groups might indicate how the industrialization process
could and should be accelerated in industrially backward coun-
tries to accomplish in one decade what has usually taken several
decades; and possibly how a highly industrialized area, faced
with an import balance, might partly meet this situation after the
war by retaining a larger share of its economy in agriculture and
promoting a shift from lower-paid export manufacturing or
mining to higher-paid production for home consumption requir-
ing additional services and trade.
1INDUSTRIALIZATION, THE UNIVERSAL NEED FOR
OCCUPATIONAL ADJUSTMENTS OUT OF AGRICULTURE INTO
OTHER INDUSTRIES AND SERVICES
The proportion of the labor force in agriculture has a particular
bearing on the emerging United Nations' interest in an Inter-
national Food and Agricultural Authority as an aid to raising
the world's nutritional and general living standards. The chief
means of expanding world food production will be through more
efficient methods and technological advances. Hand in hand with
these the proportion of the labor force in agricultural occupations
must be reduced. The industrialization process has not yet played
the role it should in raising living standards in most parts of the
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In every region, whether highly agriculturalized southeastern
Europe, China, India, Africa, Latin America, and southern United
States, or the highly industrialized areas of western Europe and
northeastern United States, per capita incomes are larger where
the proportions of the labor force engaged in agriculture are
lower; and, practically everywhere, economic programs provid-
ing for readjustment out of agriculture are called for. China,
India, many sections of Latin America, Africa, eastern Europe,
and southeastern United States are obviously over-agricultural-
ized, i.e., 60 to 85 percent of their inhabitants are engaged in
producing food and other farm products.
The low per capita incomes of China and India, it may be
expected, could be doubled by shifting no more than 15 percent
of their labor force from food production to other pursuits (with
more efficient use of human and natural resources); an addi-
tional shift of less than 10 percent would treble them. The low
incomes of Rumania and Bulgaria could be doubled if less than
20 percent of the labor force were directed into non-agricultural
pursuits. Even in a largely industrialized country such as the
United States, of whose working population less than a fifth is
now engaged in agriculture, there are over-agriculturalized areas.
For example, Mississippi (60 percent of the labor force is in
agriculture) and North Dakota (50percent)could double their
per capita incomes by programs that would shift 25 percent of
their labor force out of farming into other activity.
About 800 million of the world's present population, 2.2 bil-
lion, are classed as gainfully occupied; of these, probably 500
million are engaged in agriculture. If, in the course of a reason-
able period—say, the first two decades after the war—through
appropriate regional programs including to increase agri-
cultural productivity, it were possible to alter the world's agri-
cultural-industrial balance, so that 40 percent were engaged in
farming, instead of over 60 percent as at present, the general
gain in productivity and income and living standards would be
enormous. If the United Nations took full advantage of the
postwar opportunity to raise living standards throughout the
world, over 150 million persons in the present world population
could quit farming while the remaining 350 million increased
their efficiency.124 PART V
To determine the ideal balance between agriculture and indus-
try, both economic and sociological factors must be considered,
but as far as economic evidence is concerned, there does not seem
to be any definite indication that the reduction in agricultural
pursuits can go too far if countries can draw upon the agricultural
products of other areas. England and New England are cases in
point. England, where 6 percent are in agricultural pursuits, im-
ports more than half of its food requirements. New England
states, such as Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island,
where fewer than 3 percent are in agricultural pursuits, get
practically all their food supplies from other states. It is possible
that at some point too large concentration in non-agricultural,
secondary, industries (such as fuel mining and textiles) tends
to reduce per capita incomes and calls for a further readjustment
toward tertiary pursuits. However, evidence from all over the
world (except perhaps Australia and New Zealand, where pro-
ductivity in primary industries is greater than in secondary and
tertiary) shows that the lower the proportion in agriculture the
higher the income (Chart 1 and Table 1).
The European groups for which it is possible to discern a
relation between the agricultural proportion and income are:
1 Denmark, Norway,Sweden,Finland,Estonia,Latvia,
Lithuania
2 Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy
3 United Kingdom and Belgium
4 Czechoslovakia and Austria
5 Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania
Several countries do not come within these geographical
groups. The most obvious are Eire and Spain; Switzerland, be-
longing to Group 2 because of contiguity, appears to have a
relatively high income. Greece, and possibly Portugal, may also
be considered as belonging to Group 2. The income-agriculture
relationships for these several groups seem to be essentially
similar. It is of course likely thaè when more adequate data for
certain countries become available, closer statistical relationships
and different groupings may suggest themselves.
In eastern Europctypified by Group 1, the Baltic states—
per capita income in average prices of 192 5-34 rises from about















































































































































































































































































































































































the economies of European countries. At the same stage of indus-
trialization, some countries may have a higher income level than
others; for example, in western Europe (Group 2),40percent
in agriculture is asociated with a per capita income of about
$150; in northern and eastern Europe, of about $240. This differ-
ence is undoubtedly to be explained by such factors as population
TABLE1
NationalIncome per Capita and Percentage of Labor Force
in Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Occupations, by Countries
1925-1934
PER CAPITAINCOME
Labor TotalPERCENTAGE OF LABOR FORCE IN
force populationPrimary SecondaryTertiary
United States .$1,381 $525 19 31 50
Canada 1,337 521 35 23 42
New Zealand 1,202 457 27 24 49
United Kingdom. 1,089 425 6 44 50
Switzerland 1,018 424 22 45 33
Argentina 1,000 430 23 43 34
Australia 980 392 24 30 46
Netherlands 855 358 21 39 40
Eire 770 308 53 13 34
France 684 287 25 40 35
Denmark 680 279 36 27 37
Sweden 653 287 32 29 39
Germany 649 290 24 39 37
Spain 628 257 57 25 18
Belgium 600 240 17 48 35
Chile 550* 248 37 28 34
Norway 539 237 35 27 38
Austria 511 230 24 39 37
Czechoslovakia 455 214 27 44 29
Greece 397 180 44 34 22
Finland 380 171 51 30 19
Hungary 359 165 54 25 21
Japan 353 159 50 20 30
Poland . 352 165 62 18 20
Portugal 350 144 48 52
Latvia 345 161 52 24 24
Italy 343 154 43 31 26
Estonia 341 160 52 24 24
USSR 320 152 74 15 11
Union of South Africa 276 91 85 15
Bulgaria 259 119 67 18 15
Rumania 243 112 68 17 15
Lithuania 207 97 64 15 21
India 200 90 62 15 23
China 120 49 75 5 20
Cohn Clark, Conditions of Economic Progress, pp.41and 179; Economics of
1960, p. 71 and Appendix.
* Estimated.INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIALIZATION 127
density, per acre productivity in agriculture, industrial produc-
tivity, and the relative volume of power, mechanical equipment,
and other capital resources available torural and urban
populations.
In two contiguous countries in Latin America—Argentina and
Chilethe same general relations between industrialization and
living standards hold. A difference of 12 points in the agricultural
proportion is associated with a per capita income in Argentina
nearly $200 greater than in Chile. If the United States, Canada,
Chile, and Argentina are considered as forming a Western Hemi-
sphere group, the relation would closely approximate the Euro-
pean, and Canada would stand out as having an exceptionally
high income for its stage of industrialization, probably reflecting
the effect of proximity to the United States economy.
If we compare roughly tcontiguous' areas in the Far East—
Japan, India, and China—with Latin America, a fairly common
pattern emerges that resembles the north central and southern
European. It is tempting to observe that were it possible to
industrialize China to the point where the agricultural proportion
was 50 instead of 75 percent, its per capita income would rise
from $50 to about $150, approximating Japan's.
Neither Australia and New Zealand nor South Africa fits into
any of the foregoing groups. Russian per capita income too seems
relatively high, though not in view of the progressively higher
incomes for the same degree of industrialization as one goes
from eastern to western Europe. For example, a per capita income
of $200 is associated with 35 percent in agriculture in western
Europe, with about 45 percent in Central Europe, and with about
5 5-60 percent in eastern Europe.
These general results for regional groupings of contiguous
countries seem reasonable in the light of similar analyses for the
United States. Though less than one-fifth of the total labor force
is engaged in agriculture (as of 1939), more than half of the
states have higher proportions. As in Europe, there are several
regional groupings (see Chart 2 and Table 2). One comprises
certain north-western states —Minnesota,North and South
Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Nevada, Wyoming, Montana, and
Idaho. In North and South Dakota practically one-half of the
labor force is in agriculture and per capita income is about $330;I 28 PART V
CHART2
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National Income per Capita and Percentage of Labor Force
in Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Occupations, by States, 1939
PER CAPITA INCOMEPERCENTAGE OF LABOR FORCE
Labor Total INC
forcepopulationb PrimarySecondaryTertiary
United States $1,337 $539 18.8 30.0 51.2
Alabama 670 242 39.9 24.0 36.1
Arizona 1,263 461 21.7 22.8 55.5
Arkansas 704 246 51.6 13.9 34.5
California 1,712 741 10.8 24.3 64.9
Colorado 1,338 505 21.2 20.8 58.0
Connecticut 1,689 764 4.0 48.5 47.5
Delaware 1,781 802 13.9 35.8 50.3
Florida 1,041 442 18.9 18.5 62.6
Georgia 735 290 35.1 22.7 42.2
Idaho. 1,117 411 37.1 16.6 46.3
Illinois 1,572 671 9.9 34.4 55.7
Indiana 1,268 495 17.8 35.6 46.8
Iowa 1,237 468 35.8 16.3 47.9
Kansas 1,034 383 31.4 16.0 52.6
Kentucky 840 297 36.5 23.2 40.3
Louisiana 937 354 33.2 19.3 47.5
Maine 1,210 474 14.2 37.3 48.5
Maryland 1,401 634 10.5 32.4 57.1
Massachusetts 1,685 719 2.7 41.4 55.9
Michigan 1,437 591 11.8 43.3 44.9
Minnesota 1,251 497 30.4 17.3 52.3
Mississippi 539 201 58.0 12.8 29.2
Missouri 1,204 486 23.6 24.3 52.1
Montana 1,278 515 32.2 19.5 48.3
Nebraska 1,046 397 37.4 11.0 51.6
Nevada 1,742 767 15.4 27.0 57.6
New Hampshire 1,295 548 9.1 43.8 47.1
New Jersey 1,539 816 3.2 41.6 55.2
New Mexico 1,002 341 32.2 18.7 48.1
New York 1,895 804 4.3 32.4 63.3
North Carolina 817 308 33.8 31.0 35.2
North Dakota 888 325 53.4 5.0 41.6
Ohio 1,502 603 11.0 39.1 49.9
Oklahoma 990 340 33.1 17.1 49.8
Oregon 1,294 544 18.8 27.0 54.2
Pennsylvania 1,460 589 6.0 44.6 49.4
Rhode Island 1,492 678 2.1 50.8 47.1
South Carolina 673 261 39.6 26.4 34.0
South Dakota 949 351 48.1 8.9 43.0
Tennessee 794 295 33.2 24.3 42.5
Texas 1,040 401 29.9 18.0 52.1
Utah 1,337 443 19.4 23.2 57.4
Vermont 1,226 483 24.7 27.7 47.6
Virginia 966 402 24.6 27.9 47.5
Washington 1,413 588 14.6 28.7 56.7
"West Virginia 1,123 378 15.3 43.4 41.3
Wisconsin 1,234 485 25.9 29.4 44.7
Wyoming 1,406 567 29.6 17.4 53.0
Income per gainfully occupied was computed by dividing total income (Depart-
ment of Commerce) by total gainful workers, including those engaged in emerg-
ency work relief.
b Survey of CurrentBusiness, June1943, Department of Commerce.
CComputedfrom Census figures.130 PARTV
inMontana and Wyoming about 30 percent is in agriculture and
per capita income is about $540.
Similargroupings of contiguous states may be made for the
Pacific Coast; for the Cornbelt; for eastern states—New York,
Vermont, New Jersey, and Connecticut; and for New England
states —Maine,New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island; and for southeast and southern states running west to
Utah. In every group smaller proportions in agriculture are
associated with larger average per capita incomes.
Here, as in Europe, there are regional differences in types of
industry, population density, industrial training, power and
mechanical facilities, other capital resources, and productivity
per acre and per man, so that for the same proportion in agri-
culture, per capita incomes may be larger in one state than in
another. For example, Montana and Louisiana have the same
agricultural proportion, 32 percent, yet their per capita incomes
are, respectively, $515and$350. The point of this analysis, how-
ever, is not the reasons for these regional differences but rather
the common relations between per capita income and the degree
of industrialization within each regional group. They appear
to be virtually identical in South America, the Pacific area,
eastern and southern Europe, and in eastern and southern United
States. For most of the regional groups of states in the United
States as well as for groups of other countries, the difference
between the agricultural proportion of 40 percent and one of 20
is associated with an increase in per capita income of $200.
Three other pieces of corroborative evidence seem worth
mentioning. One is in the National Resources Planning Board
report (June 1943) on Regional Planning for the Arkansas
Valley. The plan drawn up by agricultural and industrial engi-
neers provides for reducing the agricultural population in the
Arkansas Valley Area from 3.25 million to a little over 2 million
and increasing the nonagricultural from 4.1to6 million. The
agricultural proportion would be reduced from 47 to 26 percent,
21 points. The expected industrial expansion and agricultural
reorganization for greater productivity would bring the per
capita income of the entire area up to an average of about $590
(1939prices), an increase of $245 from the 1939 average, $345.
In other words, it is expected that regional planning for theINTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIALIZATION i3'
better use of human, land, and other resources, and increased
efficiency through mechanization would raise the income level,
and thereby the living standards of the area, something like 75
percent. This is not far out of line with the analysis in Chart 2.
A reduction of 21 points in the percentage engaged in agriculture
for an area having a $345 per capita income and 47 percent en-
gaged in agriculture is associated with a rise in income of about
$215, or 60 percent.
A second corroborative item may be gleaned from the record
of United States experience. Between 1820 and 1840 the per-
centage of the United States labor force engaged in agricultural
pursuits declined from 74 to 68, only 0.3 percent per year; be-
tween 1840 and 1860, not much more—from 68 to 59, or 0.45
percent per year. Since then, the average rate of decline has been
rapid, 5.0 percent per decade. By 1940, only 17.6 percent of the
labor force was engaged in farming.
Both the long- and the short-term variations in this rate of
decline since the Civil War seem to be related to the state of
industrial activity. In the decades characterized by industrial
prosperity—those ending with 1870, 1890, 1910, and 1930—it
was 6.1 points; in the decades characterized by prolonged indus-
trial depression, 4.1 points. Industrial depression retards and
prosperity stimulates the long-term shift from agriculture to other
industries.
During longer periods, such as the forty years from 1860 to
1900, a decline in the agricultural proportion of 21 points was
associated with a doubling of per capita industrial output (as
measured by Warren M. Persons' index'). This corresponds ap-
proximately to the relationships for countries in Chart 1 and for
states in Chart 2.
The third corroborative item has to do with the more rapid
rate of industrialization in Russia between 1928 and 1939 than
between 1913 and 1928 (Table 3). The agricultural population
constituted about 81 percent of the total in 1913, 80 percent in
1928, and only 50 percent in 1939. The effect of this rapid rate of
industrialization, most of which took place during the 1930's,
may be seen in the marked growth in national income per capita
(Table 4). In 1928 per capita income (and presumably per capita
'Forecasting Business Cycles (John Wiley, 1931),p.180.Workers & office employees
Members of koihozes & artisans &
craftsmen members of cooperatives
Individually operating peasants (exci.
kulaks) & artisans & craftsmen not
members of cooperatives
'Bourgeoisie(landlords, etc.)
Others (students, school children,
pensioners, army, etc.) 2.3
Total 100.0
Population includes members of family; taken
nomic Front for War and Peace.
*Theproportions may be in error because of the unreliability of the 1937 census
of population.
output) was only a little larger than in 1913 but by 1940 it had
risen to about 4.5 times that of 1928 (Chart 3). The relation
between this rise in national income per capita and the reduction
in the agricultural proportion of the population is such that a 20
point reduction—from, say, about 70 to 50 percent—seems to
have been accompanied by a doubling of per capita income.
TABLE 4
National Income Per Capita and Percentage of Population in
Agriculture, USSR, 1913-1940 (1926-27 rubles)
1913 1928 1929 1932 1937 1940
National income per
capita (1928 =100)a 93.2100.0113.2170.2349.3
% in agricultureb 81 80 68(1934)61
Aaron Yugow, Russids Economic Front for War and Peace.
b Derived from Table 3.
2PAnERNS OP INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PER CAPITA INCOME
The different levels of income tentatively indicated in the United
States illustration for a given stage of industrialization call for
closer analysis. As already suggested, differences in productivity
and size of operations in both agriculture and industry may be
responsible for the lower per capita incomes in our southern
than in our northern states. Cohn Clark, for example, gives ap-
proximately $1,100 (1925-34 prices) as the net .per capita output
of the agricultural working population in the West North Cen-
132 PART V
TABLE 3
Social Composition of the Population, USSR
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tral, Mountain, andPacificstates; in the West South Central
states it is about 64 percent less. For 30 percent in primary pro-
duction, the per capita income from all industries in Wyoming
and Montana is about $600, and for Mississippi and Louisiana,
about $350.Asecond cause of differences in per capita income for
a given percentage in primary industries may be the concentration
of one or more industries whose earnings or productivity are
either unusually high or low. For example, relatively high per
capita incomes in Nevada, Wyoming, and Montana are due,
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capita; and the relatively low per capita income in West Virginia,
to the relatively low value of coal output per capita. Similarly,
the low per capita incomes in the United Kingdom and Belgiuni,
relative to the incomes of other west European countries for a
given percentage in primary industries, are also associated with
the heavy concentration of coal mining.
Another outstanding instance of abnormally high income for
a given percentage in primary industries is Delaware, where a
disproportionate share of income from finance is concentrated.
The year or period under consideration is also a factor. If we were
dealing with 1929, the effect of the speculative boom would be
manifest in relatively high per capita incomes in such states as
New York, Illinois, and California, where most speculative
activity centers. If we were dealing with 1919,severalof the
agricultural states would have abnormally high incomes owing
to the inflation in agricultural prices.
The dominating influence of a key area sometimes spreads into
contiguous smaller states. For example, per capita incomes in
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Vermont seem large
even in view of their high degree of industrialization. The reason
may be the spread of the effect of the large per capita earnings
and opportunities in the dominant area, New York.
Another factor may be the relative proportions of the working
force in secondary and in tertiary pursuits. The higher per capita
incomes in countries having larger proportions of their labor
force in transportation, commerce, finance, and other services
have been emphasized by Clark. I want, here, to point out certain
differences in the influence of concentration in secondary and
tertiary industries in the several regions of the United States
and in other countries.
For the United States as a whole, the pattern of industrializa-
tion is made up, by and large, of a relatively small proportion in
primary industries, a larger proportion in secondary, and the
largest in tertiary pursuits. Per capita income has run from low
to high in this same order for many years, and the order is likely
to continue for some time, with a narrowing of the gap between
secondary and tertiary income. It is this relatively smaller income
per capita in primary industries that is responsible for the lower
incomes in the states having larger proportions of the labor forceINTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIALIZATION 135
in primary industries. For the same reason, we would expect to
find generally that states with the same proportion in primary
industries, and a larger proportion in tertiary industries than in
secondary would have higher incomes.
Close examination of the data for the various states bears this
out. Five regionally selected examples of different patterns of
industrialization are shown in Table 5,arrangedin the order of
the proportions in primary industries, with the differences be-
tween the tertiary and secondary proportions. In Example 1 con-
centration is relatively high in both secondary and tertiary indus-
tries. In Examples 2 and 3 the distributions of occupations are
more nearly like that in the United States as a whole. In Example
4 the labor force is distributed nearly equally in each of the three
groups. In Example 5theconcentration is greatest in primary and
tertiary, least in secondary.
TABLE 5
Patterns of Industrialization in the United States
and Income Per Capita of Population
PER




NewJersey 3 42 55 +13 816
Connecticut 4 48 48 0 764
Example 2
Illinois 10 34 56 +22 671
Michigan 12 43 45 + 2 591.
Example 3
California 11 24 65 +41 741
Washington 14 29 57 +28 588
Example 4
North Carolina 34 31 35 + 4 308
Georgia 35 23 42 +19 290
Example 5
Arkansas 52 14 .34 +20 246
Mississippi 58 13 29 +16 201
Source: Table 2.
If we take these five examples as units, the outstanding fact
is that the greater the conceitration in primary industries the
lower the per capita income. Example 3, with the two Pacific
states, California and Washington, is an exception. But if we136 PART V
compare the patterns'for the twostatesin each example, the state
having the greater concentration in tertiary industries has the
larger per capita income. Example 4, with the two southern
states, North Carolina and Georgia, is the exception here. These
examples suggest also the possibility that influences of concentra-
tion in both secondary and tertiary industries may vary regionally.
In the relations noted so far between the agricultural propor-
tion and per capita income, it has been assumed that a decrease or
increase in the former is accompanied by an equal shift into
secondary and tertiary occupations. To determine whether there
is any additional income advantage in shifting a larger propor-
tion into one or the other, we examined the additional effect on
income that may be associated with present differences between
the secondary and tertiary proportions. For a given proportion
in agriculture, incomes tend to be larger where the tertiary pro-
portion substantially exceeds the secondary, the excess varying
regionally.
Based as they are on the income for only one year, 1939, these
results are tentative. To obviate sporadic situations, if any, it
might be desirable to experiment with income for more than one
year. Different groupings of states thight yield somewhat differ-
ent results; as also might treating the secondary and tertiary pro-
portions separately in the statistical analysis.
In this experimental analysis, we grouped the statesas
follows:
1Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Con-
necticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, West Virginia
2Virginia,Kentucky,NorthCarolina,SouthCarolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee
3 a) Mississippi, Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana,
Ohio
b) Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa
4Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Col-
orado, Nebraska, Utah, California, Washington, Oregon
5Nevada, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wyoming
For each area, we ascertained (a) the net relation of the
primary proportion to per capita income on the condition thatINTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIALIZATION 137
the rest of the working force is divided equally between sec-
ondary and tertiary occupations, and (b) the net additional
effect of different proportions as between secondary and ter-
occupations indicated by the excess of the proportion in
tertiary over that in secondary. The essential features of the
results (Chart 4) may be seen by noting how a decrease in
the primary proportion from 25 to 15 percent, with equal por-
tions in secondary and tertiary pursuits, affects income, and the
additional change in income due to a 10-point excess of tertiary
over secondary occupations, that is, if the reduction in primary
industries is made up by an increase in tertiary. A 10-point
increase in industrial progress in the East and South (regions
1, 2, 3) apparently tends to add $100 to $150 (1939 prices)
per capita, and in the western states substantially more. Further-
more, if industrial progress is so great as to shift a larger pro-
portion into tertiary industries than into secondary, there is a
tendency for an additional increase in the average per capita
income, except in the South. These regional differences show
up whether expressed as absolute dollar increases or as per-
centages of the regional income levels.
To pursue this type of study further, we would have to delve
into the actual earnings or productivity of the various occupa-
tional groups, by states. Much could be done to make such data
available in comparable and systematic form, and there is every
reason to expect that they would turn out to be 'pay dirt'.
This line of investigation is likely to prove fruitful in areas
outside the United States also.The information for other
countries is less detailed than that for the United States. How-
ever, we do have data to show that in most countries of heavy
concentration in primary and secondary industries maximum
incomes are likely to be attained by decreasing occupational
concentration in agricultural pursuits and increasing it rela-
tively more in tertiary. For example, in the countries of north-
western Continental Europe—The Netherlands, France, Ger-
many, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Nor-
way—an average per capita income of about $300, associated
with 25 percent in primary occupations (and the balance
equally divided between secondary and tertiary), would be in-
creased about $100, or 33 percent, if the agricultural propor-138 PART V
CHART4
Relation of Percentôge of Labor Force Engaged in Primary,
Secondary, and Tertiary Occupations and Per Capita lncome
United States,1939
I.Maine, N. H., Vt., Mass., Conn., R.l., N.Y., N. J., Pa., Del., and W.Va.
2.Va., Ky., N,.C., S.C., Ga., Fla., Ala., and Tenn.
3.(a) Miss., Ark., Kans., Mo., Ill., md., and Ohio
(b) Mich., Wis., and Iowa
4.La.1 OkIa., Tex., N.M., Ariz., Cob., Nebr,, Utah, Calif., Wash., and Oreg;
5.Ney., Idaho, Mont., N.D., S.D., and Wyo.
Per capita income (dollars)
Percentage in primary occupations
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tion were reduced to 15percentand the balance divided equally
between secondary and tertiary occupations; but if the entire
shift from primary were directed into tertiary occupations there
would be an additional increase in per capita incomes of $40-
50.This is about what our analysis of eastern and southern
United States shows.
In this analysis for western Europe, the depressive effect on
income of over-concentration in fuel mining, already observed
in 'West Virginia, is striking. Relatively low per capita incomes
in both Belgium and the United Kingdom seem to be asso-
ciated with the relatively large proportion of their labor force
in coal mining, an industry that should probably be classed as
primary, for it has an effect on the general level of income more
nearly like that of agriculture than general manufacturing and
construction.
If we compare the per capita incomes of countries in regions
not necessarily contiguous—the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Europe as a
whole—it is also clear that, aside from the differences in the
proportion in primary industries, the countries having higher
per capita ,incomes are those that have a relatively larger pro-
portion of their labor force in tertiary than in secondary indus-
tries. This is particularly true of the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Ireland, and in less degree, the United
Kingdom.
While the illustrations for the United States and other coun-
tries indicate, in general, a higher per capita income in areas
where a larger proportion of the working population is en-
gaged in tertiary occupations, it cannot be argued that a shift
out of agriculture should everywhere be directed into tertiary
occupations alone. The tertiary occupations depend in no small
degree upon a large scale specialized or manufacturing economy.
As Cohn Clark pointed out in Conditions of Economic Pro g-
ress, a balanced economy progresses to the highest income level
in three steps: first, the intensification of primary production;
second, the expansion of manufacturing industries; third, the
opening of tertiary pursuits to service the rest of the economy.
If agricultural countries, such as China and India, follow the
experience of the United States from 1850 to 1900, large-scale140 PART V
growth would tend to be concentrated in secondary establish-
ments first, shifting later to tertiary occupations. However, the
lag between secondary and tertiary development could un-
doubtedly be considerably shortened.
3LIMITS TO INDUSTRIALIZATION
The foregoing evidence of a universal tendency toward higher
per capita incomes where smaller proportions of working popu-
lations are engaged in agricultural pursuits, raises the question,
how far can the reduction in the agricultural proportion go?
As we have seen, it can go to practically zero in any area that
can depend on outside sources for food and other farm prod-
ucts. Indeed, every large urban industrial center is an illustra-
tion of this obvious fact. How far can the industrialization
process go in a country that wants to be relatively self-sufficient
in farm products or that does not have -the advantage of near-
ness to agricultural production, as do the New England and
other states? It would seem that England might be self-sufficient
in food if 12 to 15 percent of its working population were em-
ployed in farming, instead of 6 percent. While this is a rough
calculation, it is corroborated by the current and prospective
experience in the United States, where only 18 percent of the
working population is engaged in agriculture and the net agri-
cultural export balance is small. In view of the long-time trend
in agricultural efficiency, it is quite likely that in the 1950's
12 to 15 percent of the total working population will suffice
to produce the farm products required for full employment.
From these two bits of evidence it may be tentatively in-
ferred that with modern production methods, scientific use of
soils, mechanization, higher productivity from more productive
plants and animals, the normal limit of industrialization might
be to have one-seventh or one-eighth of the working population
in farming.
This limit, however, is probably too distant an objective for
countries that are still 70-80 percent agricultural. On the other
hand, some of the countries or states that have industrialized to
a proportion below 12-15 percent in agriculture may have
reached diminishing social as well as economic returns, espe-
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industries has been too great. On the principle of the 'golden
mean' it may be that highly agriculturalized countries should
set their industrialization goals at about 40 percent of their
working population in agriculture.
4 CONCLUSIONS
From the selected material presented here it is obvious that if
a United Nations effort were made to bring about an improve-
ment in living standards, leading to a better balance between
agricultural and industrial occupations, the main effort should
be focused in certain areas and consideration given to particular
secondary industries that yield abnormally low earnings. If,
over a period of years, policies that tended to bring the agri-
cultural proportion of industrially backward countries down to
40 percent were pursued, the regions involved would be eastern
and southern Europe, much of Africa, much of Latin America,
and India and China. Taking present population, most of the
occupational shifts would be in China (about 70 million), India
(about 27 million), USSR (about 13 million), Poland (about
2 million), Japan (about 2 million), and Latin America (about
2 million).
The aggregate number that economic programs would shift
out of farming is large, for over 60 percent of the world's labor
force is engaged in agriculture. Lowering this proportion 20
points—bringing the world's agricultural proportion down to
40-45percentin the course of the first decade after the war—
would mean an aggregate shift of 150-17 5millionagricultural
laborers, if the total world population did not grow. However,
current records of population trends indicate that by 1955 the
world's population, instead of being 2.2 billion (as of 1940),
could increase to 2.5 billion, or roughly 16 percent in 15 years
(Table 6).
At the present ratio between working and total population,
about 40 percent, it is conceivable that by 1955 140 million
people would be added to the labor force, chiefly in the highly
agriculturalized areas of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and east-
ern Europe. That is, by 1955 the world's agricultural labor force
may be about 50 million larger than it was in 1940.
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TABLE 6




America 275 336 12
Europe, excl. USSR 400 419 5
USSR 171 216 26
Asia, exci. USSR 1,184 1,376 16
Australia & Oceania 11 13 25
Africa 159 185 16
Total 2,200 2,545 16
Frank W. Notestein, Population: The Long View, in Theodore W. Schultz, Edi-
tor, Food in World Affairs, Part Ii, Population (University of Chicago Press,
1945).
effort can be indicated by noting what would happen to per
capita and total incomes if we assumed some arbitrary goal.
Suppose our over-agriculturalized states shaped their rehabilita-
tion and economic programs toward having only 30 percent in
agriculture. The 1939 per capita income of the 19 states that
exceed this percentage is $330. The assumed goal would mean
an average income of $390, an increase of 18 percent. If the
shift were directed entirely into tertiary industries, the increase
would be more nearly 25 percent.
For the rest of the world, particularly for the under-indus-
trialized and heavily populated areas, the possible economic
gain is far greater. Suppose that the economies of all European
and Asiatic countries having more than 40 percent in agricul-
ture were rehabilitated, developed, and occupationally read-
justed down to that proportion and those of the Western Hem-
isphere countries down to 30 percent. In the 20 countries con-
cerned, the average per capita income (1925-34) was about
$70. The marked degree of industrialization suggested could
raise per capita income about 170 percent, to $190; and if in
selected areas the shift could be directed entirely into tertiary
industries, the increase could be as much as 200 percent. As the
population of these countries is 1.25 billion, such an increase
in per capita incomes would add nearly $150 billion to the
world's income, estimated to have been about $250 billion in
1925-34. This increase would be shared chiefly by China, India,
and Russia. World income would, in fact, be even greater, forINTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIALIZATION 143
population would increase fully 10 percent if the hypothetical
adjustments were effected during one decade.
These rough computations should suffice to emphasize these
conclusions: (1)opportunitiesfor raising living standards exist
everywhere, at home and abroad; (2) industrialization, with
considerable improvement in efficiency, can do a great deal
more than it has for people who are tied to the land, enabling
them to produce food and other agricultural raw materials for
themselves and for other countries; (3) the progress of indus-
trialization is of course largely up to the countries concerned,
but it could be greatly speeded up by international cooperation
in capital and managerial assistance; and (4) the large gains
in income that would accrue to the under-industrialized coun-
tries and the accompanying increase in demand for goods and
services of other countries, would, under almost any stable in-
ternational circumstances, spread out to benefit all countries.